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Abstract
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is a popular
topic modeling technique for discovery of hidden
semantic architecture of text datasets, and plays
a fundamental role in many machine learning ap-
plications. However, like many other machine
learning algorithms, the process of training a LDA
model may leak the sensitive information of the
training datasets and bring significant privacy risks.
To mitigate the privacy issues in LDA, we focus
on studying privacy-preserving algorithms of LDA
model training in this paper. In particular, we first
develop a privacy monitoring algorithm to inves-
tigate the privacy guarantee obtained from the in-
herent randomness of the collapsed gibbs sampling
(CGS) process in a typical LDA training algorithm
on centralized curated datasets. Then, we further
propose a locally private LDA training algorithm
on crowdsourced data to provide local differential
privacy for individual data contributors. The exper-
imental results on real-world datasets demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms.
1 Introduction
Massive text data have arisen in the sustained and rapid
development of Internet. Mining and analyzing of text data
can help us gain a vast amount of knowledge, thus benefiting
the whole society. As a fundamental model for text mining,
Latent Dirichlet Allocation(LDA) [Blei et al., 2003] can be
used for discovering the main features of the sparse text
datasets by identifying their hidden semantic architecture.
Particularly, LDA can map the high-dimensional text data to
a low-dimensional topic space while retaining the implicit
semantics, which has been an effective machine learning
technique for clustering or classification. Many enter-
prises such as Yahoo [Smola and Narayanamurthy, 2010],
Tencent [Wang et al., 2014][Yut et al., 2017], and Mi-
crosoft [Yuan et al., 2015] have all built LDA platforms for
supporting big data analysis and training machine learning
models on various text data.
Similar to other machine learning models, LDA may be
trained on the datasets that contain some sensitive informa-
tion of individuals and will inevitably memorize some knowl-
edge about the datasets. Unfortunately, aiming at this char-
acteristic, some attacks have been proposed to extract the
private information of the training data from machine learn-
ing models. For example, membership inference attacks
(MIA)[Shokri et al., 2017] can be launched to infer the mem-
bership information of an individual. Model inversion attacks
[Fredrikson et al., 2014] have been proved to be able to ex-
tract training data from observed model predictions. There-
fore, despite the popularity and effectiveness, the naive LDA
model may also suffer from these attacks and lead to great
privacy risks.
Differential privacy proposed by
Dwork [Dwork et al., 2006] has been the de-facto stan-
dard of privacy protection with a rigorous mathematical
proof. Due to its strong privacy guarantee, DP has
also been exploited in many fields such as data pub-
lication [Ren et al., 2018][Li et al., 2019]and machine
learning [Chaudhuri et al., 2011][Abadi et al., 2016] as well
as LDA training [Park et al., 2016][Zhu et al., 2016]. For
example, Park et al. [Park et al., 2016] proposed to obtain
privacy guarantee for LDA models by perturbing the ex-
pected sufficient statistics in each iteration of the variational
Bayesian method, which is a parameter estimation algorithm
for LDA. Zhu et. al. [Zhu et al., 2016] presented a differ-
entially private LDA algorithm by perturbing the sampling
distribution in the collapsed Gibbs sampling(CGS) process,
which is a typical training algorithm for LDA.
Both the above algorithms achieve DP by injecting ex-
tra noise to the training process of LDA regarding to cen-
tralized training datasets. However, as a typical sam-
pling algorithm with inherent randomness, CGS possesses
uncertainty in its execution and naturally provides some
level of privacy guarantee, which has been indicated in
[Wang et al., 2015][Foulds et al., 2016]. In particular, Wang
et al. [Wang et al., 2015] proved that posterior sampling and
the stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo tech-
niques possess some inherent privacy guarantee. Foulds et
al. [Foulds et al., 2016] further extended this conclusion to
the general MCMC methods. Besides the inherent privacy,
both existing algorithms consider the LDA model training
on centralized datasets owned by a trustworthy data cura-
tor. Nevertheless, due to privacy concerns, individual data
contributors may be reluctant to directly share their sensitive
data but prefer to send the locally sanitized data to the model
trainer.
Therefore, aiming to provide strong privacy guarantee for
LDAmodel training, this paper not only investigates to utilize
the inherent privacy of CGS in LDA training on centralized
datasets, but also proposes a locally private version of LDA
that can be trained on crowd-sourced datasets with local san-
itations. The contributions are summarized as follows:
• We develop a privacy monitoring algorithm to mea-
sure the inherent privacy guarantee of CGS algorithm in
LDA. In particular, we first define two different levels of
privacy: document level and word level, and present the
corresponding lower bound of privacy guarantee after a
given number of iterations.
• We propose LP-LDA, a novel mechanism that supports
training a LDA model on crowd-sourced datasets with
local sanitation, which can provide the guarantee of local
privacy for individual data contributors.
• We conduct experiments on several real-world datasets
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed algo-
rithms. Particularly, experimental results show that our
LP-LDA can achieve a high model training accuracy
while providing sufficient local privacy guarantee.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the preliminaries. Section 3 describes our algorithms in de-
tail. The experiments are presented in Section 4. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 LDA and Collapsed Gibbs Sampling
LDA model was first proposed by David
Blei [Blei et al., 2003] in 2003 for analyzing the im-
plicit semantic architecture of a corpus. In LDA model, any
document m in a corpus D can be described by different
distributions on K latent topics, where each topic k can be
represented by a distribution on all words. LDA assumes
the generative process of the documents in the corpus D as
follows:
1. for each topic k, draw a “topic-word” distribution φk on
all words t from Dirichlet(β~1), where β is the hyperpa-
rameter for the Dirichlet priors and can be interpreted as
the prior observation for the “topic-word” count.
2. for each document m, draw a “document-topic” distri-
bution θm from Dirichlet(α~1), where α is a hyperparam-
eter similar to β and represents the prior observation for
the “document-topic” count.
3. for each word w in a document m, first draw a topic k
from θm, and then draw a word t from φk .
The essence of training a LDA model is to estimate the
parameters φk for a given corpus D. The collapsed Gibbs
sampling is such an effective parameter estimation algorithm.
It iterates over each word wi and samples new topic zi for wi
based on this full conditional distribution
p(zi = k|~z¬i, ~w) ∝
ntk + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)
·
nkm + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m + α)
(1)
where ¬i denotes the whole words except word wi, n
t
k de-
notes the count of topic k assigned to word t and nkm denotes
the count of topic k appeared in documentmwhich are main-
tained in matricesN tk and N
k
m respectively.
After multiple rounds of sampling over the whole corpus,
the topic sample of each word can be obtained. And the pa-
rameter φk can be estimated by its posterior expectation
E[φtk|~z, ~w] =
ntk + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)
The detailed procedures of CGS can be referred
to [Heinrich, 2005].
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy proposed by Dwork [Dwork et al., 2006]
has been the de-facto standard of privacy protection with a
rigorous mathematical proof. The rationale of DP guarantee
is that negligible information can be gained by manipulating
the output of a query on neighboring datasets.
Definition 1. [Dwork et al., 2006] (Differential Privacy) A
randomized mechanismM : D → Y is ε-differential private
if for any neighboring datasets D,D
′
that satisfying
|D∆D′| = 1 and any output S ⊆ Y :
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr[M(D
′
) ∈ S]
2.3 Local Privacy
Differential privacy implicitly assumes a centralized dataset
owned by a trustworthy curator and does not ensure the pri-
vacy guarantee for individual data contributors. Recently, lo-
cal (differential) privacy has been proposed to provide data
sanitization at the individual users’ side instead of the central
server side.
Definition 2. [Dwork et al., 2014](Local Privacy) A ran-
domized function f satisfies ε-local privacy if and only if for
any two input tuples t and t′ in the domain of f , and for any
output t∗ of f , there is:
Pr[f(t) = t∗] ≤ eεPr[f(t′) = t∗]
3 Our Approach
In this section, we first investigate the inherent privacy of
CGS process in LDA for a non-sanitized dataset owned by
a trustworthy curator. Then, as a complement to the pri-
vacy guarantee of the data acquisition period, a locally pri-
vate mechanism LP-LDA is presented to realize LDA model
training on a sanitized dataset by local users.
3.1 Privacy monitoring Algorithm
Inherent Privacy of CGS
Generally, DP is achieved on most machine learning algo-
rithms by introducing extra noise or randomness, which will
inevitably cause a utility loss of the trained model. However,
it has been shown in [Foulds et al., 2016] that some degree
of inherent DP can be obtained on Gibbs sampling algorithm
for free. This is because each sampling process in Gibbs sam-
pling works in a way the same as an exponential mechanism,
which is a classic method to achieve DP. Obviously, as one
version of Gibbs sampling, collapsed Gibbs sampling natu-
rally inherits this property. Furthermore, such a property can
also provide privacy for free in the CGS-based LDA train-
ing process. Therefore, aiming to utilize the inherent privacy,
we develop a privacy monitoring algorithm to quantify the
privacy guarantee of CGS in the LDA training process. In
particular, the rationale behind the privacy monitoring algo-
rithm is to find an adequate exponential mechanism for each
sampling process in CGS and then accumulate the total pri-
vacy guarantee of all exponential mechanisms according to
the composition theorem of DP.
Document-level privacy and word-level privacy
This paper considers to provide DP for the individual words
and documents in the training corpus for LDA, respectively.
Word-level privacy: Let D = {w1, w2, ...wW } denote a
corpus with |D| = W words wi (i = 1, 2, ...,W ). Then, its
neighboring dataset D′ satisfying |D∆D′| = 1 differs from
D by a single word w. Word-level privacy prevents member-
ship inference of individual words of the training corpus from
the trained LDA model.
Document-level privacy: Let D = {m1,m2, ...mM} de-
note a corpus with |D| = M documentsmi (i = 1, 2, ...,M).
Then, its neighboring dataset D′ satisfying |D∆D′| = 1 dif-
fers from D by a single document m. In order to bound
the sensitivity, we assume that a single document includes
at most Nmax words. Document-level privacy prevents re-
identification of individual documents in the training dataset
of LDA, which may be contributed by and associated with
individual users.
Inherent privacy in each sampling
To begin with, we show the essence of the intrinsic privacy
guarantee in each sampling of CGS in terms of exponential
mechanism. Consider the sampling process for word wi in
the nth iteration. Suppose its sampling distribution onK top-
ics is given by P = (p1, p2, ..., pK)
⊤, where pk denotes the
probability that topic k is assigned to wi in this sampling.
Then we can rewrite pk as
pk = e
(2∆ ln pk) ln pk
2∆ ln pk ,
which could be understood as an output probability of an
exponential mechanism ME(wi, u,K) that selects the topic
k ∈ K with probability of pk. The utility function of
ME(wi, u,K) is u(wi, k) = ln pk and its sensitivity is
∆ ln pk. Obviously, ε = 2∆ ln pk is the intrinsic privacy
guarantee of the exponential mechanismME(wi, u,K).
Privacy monitoring for each sampling
Unfortunately, it’s intractable to specify an exact value of
2∆ ln pk in the execution process of CGS algorithm in LDA
due to the complicated architecture of training corpus, hence
we attempt to find an upper bound of 2∆ ln pk to quantify the
privacy guarantee ε.
According to Equation (1), the sampling distributionP for
word wi = t inD in the n-th iteration could be computed by
pk ∝ rk =
ntk + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)
·
nkm + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m + α)
Suppose thatP′ = (p′1, p
′
2, ..., p
′
K)
⊤ is the corresponding dis-
tribution onD′, which is the neighboring dataset ofD, then
p′k ∝ r
′
k =
ntk + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)−Nk
·
nkm + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m + α)
(2)
whereNk denotes the count of topic k assigned in theD−D
′
where k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. We refer to {N1, N2, ..., Nk} as a
topic partition onD −D′ and
∑
Nk = |D −D
′|.
Given a topic partition γ = {N1, N2, ..., Nk}, the privacy
guarantee in this sampling process could be measured by
εγ = max
k∈{1,2,...,K}
{2ξk} = max
k∈{1,2,...,K}
{2 ln
p′k
pk
}
where ξk denotes the sensitivity of ln pk. However, there
are
(
N+K−1
K−1
)
partitions in total. So, it is computational pro-
hibitive to find the maximal εγ among all partitions. In the
following, we consider how to reduce the searching space of
partitions.
For simplicity, we first consider a special case, in which
there exists some topic i with Ni = 0 in a given partition.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists some Nk = 0 in a
given partition γ = {N1, N2, ..., NK}, then the privacy guar-
antee
εγ = 2ξk = 2max{ξ1 ξ2 ..., ξK} = 2 ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
, (3)
if and only if for any j 6= k
ln
∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)−Nj
< 2 ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
(4)
Proof. See Appendix A for details.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there exists a topic set T =
{k, ..., j} with {Nj 6= 0, ∀j ∈ T } in a given partition γ,
and it holds that
ln
∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)−Nk
> 2 ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
for some k ∈ T , then the privacy guarantee
εγ = 2max
k∈T
{ln(
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
·
rk
r′k
)} > 2 ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
(5)
Proof. This proof follows from the result of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 and corollary 1 illustrate a special case to find
the privacy εγ . The following lemma and theorem further
demonstrate that among all the partitions, the one with the
largest privacy guarantee belongs to a partitions set P =
{γ|∃k, s.t. Nk = N,Nj = 0, ∀j 6= k}.
Lemma 1. There exists a partition γ∗ in
P = {γ|∃k, s.tNk = N,Nj = 0, ∀j 6= k} (6)
such that ∑
γ∗
r′k = maxγ
{
∑
k
r′k|γ ∈ Γ}
where Γ denotes the set consisting of all the partitions.
Proof. See Appendix B for details.
Definition 3. (Pseudo sampling distribution) Suppose that
given a vector q with length K, each component
qk =
ntk + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k + β)−N
·
nkm + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m + α)
(7)
Algorithm 1 Privacy Monitoring for Each Sampling
Input: word count matrices N tk and N
k
m, N = |D − D
′|
(D = 1 for word-level privacy or D = Nmax for document-
level privacy)
Parameter: hyper parameters α, β
Output: privacy guarantee ε
1: compute the sampling distribution P with pk ∝ rk =
ntk+β∑
V
t=1(n
t
k
+β)
·
nkm+α∑
K
k=1(n
k
m+α)
2: compute pseudo sampling distribution q with qk =
ntk+β∑
V
t=1(n
t
k
+β)−N
·
nkm+α∑
K
k=1(n
k
m+α)
3: for each component qk of q do
4: compute ξk = ln(
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
· rkqk )
5: end for
6: find index k such that |rk − qk| = ‖r− q‖∞
7: compute ξ = ln(
∑
j 6=k rj+qk∑
j
rj
) with qk
8: return ε = 2max{ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξK , ξ}
Then q is the pseudo sampling distribution in this sampling.
Theorem 2. Among all the partitions, there must exist a par-
tition γ′ in
P = {γ|∃k, s.tNk = N,Nj = 0, ∀j 6= k}
such that
εγ′ = max
γ
{ε|γ ∈ Γ} = 2 ln(
∑
j 6=k rj + qk∑
j rj
) (8)
if condition (4) holds. k is the topic index such that |rk −
qk| = ‖r− q‖∞, qis the pseudo sampling distribution.
Proof. See Appendix C for details.
Theorem 2 indicates that only the partitions in P need to be
considered for computing the privacy ε in the each sampling
processing, which greatly reduce the searching scope. In par-
ticular, if condition (4) holds for all partitions in P , the pri-
vacy guarantee could be computed directly by Equation (8),
which is the first case to consider. If not, for any partition γ in
P not satisfying condition (4), the privacy guarantee could be
computed by Equation (5). Due to the arbitrariness of γ, we
have anotherK cases to consider since there areK partitions
in P . Furthermore, since whether condition (4) holds is un-
known, we have to enumerate all theseK+1 cases to find the
privacy guarantee bound. Algorithm 1 presents the searching-
based algorithm for monitoring the privacy guarantee of each
sampling for each word.
Privacy monitoring for LDA
So far, the privacy guarantee εiw of the sampling process for
word w in the ith iteration can be measured by Algorithm 1.
Since the sampling process of the whole CGS algorithm is
iteratively performed for each word but alternatively among
all the words in the corpus, the total privacy guarantee of the
whole CGS process in LDA training could be computed ac-
cording to the composition theorems of DP.
Theorem 3. Given a corpus D, suppose the CGS algorithm
performed on word w at the i-th iteration satisfies εiw-DP,
Algorithm 2 Privacy Monitoring for CGS in LDA
Input: document corpus D
Parameter: iteration number n
Output:privacy guarantee ε
1: while not finished do
2: for each documentm in D do
3: for each word w in m do
4: compute the sampling distribution p
5: call algorithm 1 to compute εiw
6: sample a topic and update matrices Ntk and N
k
m
7: end for
8: end for
9: end while
10: returnmaxw{
∑n
i=1 ε
i
w}
then after n iterations, the whole CGS algorithm performed
onD satisfiesmaxw{
∑n
i=1 ε
i
w}-DP.
Proof. For any word w, after n iterations of sampling, it will
be accessed to by the whole CGS process n times, according
to the sequential composition theorem [Li et al., 2016], the
total privacy guarantee for word w in the CGS algorithm is
εw =
∑n
i=1 ε
i
w. While, according to the Equation (1), each
iteration of CGS in LDA only accesses to each word once to
perform the sampling, then according to the parallel composi-
tion theorem [Li et al., 2016], the total privacy guarantee for
the copus(all words) should be the maximum privacy guaran-
tee of CGS among all words, that ismaxw{
∑n
i=1 ε
i
w}.
Based on this observation, Algorithm 2 shows the privacy
monitoring algorithm for the whole CGS process in LDA.
3.2 LP-LDA
As analyzed above, CGS algorithm can intrinsically guaran-
tee the privacy of individual documents for the LDA model
trained on a plain-text dataset, which is owned by a trust-
worthy curator. However, in many distributed applications,
data servers are not always privacy-reliable and data owners
may not be willing to directly contribute their sensitive data.
In this case, we further propose a hidden-data based LDA
mechanism LP-LDA that can perform the training process
on a sanitized dataset with local privacy. In particular, the
LP-LDA mechanism mainly consists of two components: lo-
cal perturbation at the user side and training on reconstructed
dataset at the server side.
Local perturbation
The local perturbation at the user side includes the following
steps:
• Step 1. Each documentm is encoded as a binary vector
Vm, in which each bitVm[j] represents the presence of
the j-th word in the word bag of the corpus.
• Step 2. Each bit Vm[j] of the binary vector Vm is then
randomly flipped according to the following randomized
response rule:
Vˆm[i] =


Vm[j], with probability of 1− f
1, with probability of f/2
0, with probability of f/2
where f ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that specifies the ran-
domness of flipping and adjusts the local privacy level.
• Step 3. Then the noisy binary vector Vˆm[j] is sent to the
central server by each user. Obviously, Vˆm[j] is locally
sanitized without concerning user’s privacy.
Training on reconstructed dataset
After receiving the flipped binary vectors from a large num-
ber of data contributors, the central server can aggregate the
vectors, reconstruct the dataset and then perform training on
the reconstructed dataset. The rationale behind this is that
the training result of topic-word distribution is insensitive to
the document partitions and only depends on the total word
counts in the corpus.
• Step 1. For each bit in the noisy binary vectors, the
server counts the number of 1′s as nt =
∑M
i=1 Vˆm[t].
• Step 2. The server then estimates the true count Nt
of each bit in the original binary vectors Vm as Nˆt =
(2nt − fM)/2(1− f).
• Step 3. For each bit, the server first computes the differ-
ence δt = Nˆt − nt.
• Step 4. For each bit t, if δt > 0, the server randomly
samples δt binary vectors with the t-th bit as 0 and sets
the t-th bit as 1; if δt < 0, then the server randomly
samples |δt| binary vectors with the t-th bit as 1 and sets
the t-th bit as 0; otherwise, keeps the noisy bit vectors as
received.
• Step 5. Based on the noisy bit vectors, the server recon-
structs a dataset and performs the CGS process on it.
Privacy Analysis of LP-LDA
Theorem 4. The LP-LDA satisfies ε-differential privacy for
each document contributor where ε = ln 1−f/2f/2 .
Proof. Suppose a word t appears in a noisy bit vector, then
the probability of it being kept from the original bit vector is
Pr(Vˆm[t] = 1|Vm[t] = 1) = 1 − f/2 and the probability
of it being flipped from the original bit vector is Pr(Vˆm[t] =
1|Vm[t] = 0) = f/2. Then, according to the definition of
DP, it guarantees the privacy of
ε =
∣∣∣∣∣ln
Pr(Vˆm[t] = 1|Vm[t] = 1)
Pr(Vˆm[t] = 1|Vm[t] = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣ = ln
1− f/2
f/2
.
The analysis also holds for any bit t that Vˆm[t] = 0.
Since the reconstruction and training process are essen-
tially post-processes on the noisy bit vectors, the local privacy
remains unchanged for all the documents.
Utility Analysis of LP-LDA
Theorem 5. LetNt and nt denote the counts of word t in the
original and perturbed datasets, respectively, then
Nˆt =
2nt − fM
2(1− f)
(9)
is an unbiased estimator ofNt with the variance of
D(Nˆt) =
(2− f)fM
4(1− f)2
. (10)
Dataset #. words #. training docs #. test docs
KOS 209169 3000 430
NIPS 410753 1349 150
Enron 356363 8000 2000
Table 1: Details about the real-world datasets
Proof. Let n1 denote the count of word t retained from the
real datasets and n2 denote the noisy part, then n1 and n2
follow two Binomial distributions, i.e., n1 ∼ B(Nt, 1−f/2),
n2 ∼ B(M − Nt, f/2). Let X = n1 + n2, then its first
theoretical momentE(X) = Nt(1−f/2)+(M−Nt)·(f/2)
and its first sample moment X¯ = nt. Therefore,
Nˆt =
2nt − fM
2(1− f)
is the moment estimator as well as unbiased estimator. Its
variance is then
D(Nˆt) =
var(nt)
(1− f)2
=
var(n1 + n2)
(1 − f)2
=
(2− f)fM
4(1− f)2
.
4 Experiment
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
privacy monitoring algorithm and locally private LDA algo-
rithm LP-LDA on real-world datasets.
The datasets used in our experiment are: KOS1: contains
3430 blog entries from dailykos website. NIPS2: contains
1740 research papers from NIPS conference. Enron3: con-
tains 0.5 million email messages from about 150 users.
We extracted part of these datasets as our training datasets
and the rest as the testsets. For simplicity, we setup a pre-
processing phase on these dataset before running our experi-
ments. For example, all stop words were removed and 1000
most frequent words in each dataset were chosen as the cor-
responding vocabulary list. Details about these datasets after
pre-processing can be found in Table 1.
In our experiments, for all datasets, the topic number is
set as 50, the maximum iteration number of CGS process in
LDA model training is set as 300, which is sufficient for con-
vergence on all three datasets. The hyper parameters α and β
are set as 0.1, 0.01, respectively.
4.1 Inherent privacy of CGS in LDA
Figure 1 illustrates the inherent privacy guarantee of CGS al-
gorithm in LDA measured by our proposed privacy monitor-
ing algorithm on three datasets for both document-level and
word-level privacy. It should be noted that a larger privacy
parameter ε in the figures means less privacy guarantee.
As we can see in both subfigures, both word-level and
document-level privacy parameter ε of CGS in LDA increase
approximately linearly with the number of sampling itera-
tions. This is because the privacy bound in each iteration of
sampling is very close, and the total privacy parameter will
1http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
2http://nips.djvuzone.org/txt.html
3www.cs.cmu.edu/ enron
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Figure 1: privacy guarantee vs. iteration number of CGS in LDA
accumulate with the number of iterations according to the se-
quential composition theorem.
Although CGS on all datasets can obtain privacy guaran-
tee for free, the inherent privacy varies on different datasets.
For document level, the privacy guarantee achieved on NIPS
is the weakest while that on Enron is the strongest. That is
because the documents in NIPS averagely contain the most
words, which also means it is the most difficult to be effec-
tively hidden. For word-level privacy, the LDA model trained
on NIPS has the strongest privacy guarantee because it con-
tains largest number of words and the sampling probability
for each uniqueword will be the lowest. On the contrary, with
the fixed length of vocabulary list, KOS contains the fewest
words in total and results the weakest word-level privacy after
same number of iteration.
4.2 Local mechanism
Figure 2 depicts the simulation performance of our proposed
LP-LDA mechanism in terms of different level of privacy.
The flipping probability f in LP-LDA varies from 0.5 to
0.001, and the corresponding privacy level varies from 1.089
to 7.6004. The utility of LDA model training is measured
by the perplexity on test sets. Perplexity is an information-
theoretical measure commonly used to evaluate the predic-
tion performance of LDA model and generally smaller per-
plexity on a test set means better prediction accuracy. In
particular, we compared LP-LDA with a baseline privacy-
preserving LDA mechanism based on Laplace mechanism,
in which the sufficient statistics of the likelihood, i.e., word
count matricesN tk and N
k
m are privatized at the beginning of
the CGS algorithm with the sensitivity of 1 and privacy of
ε [Foulds et al., 2016].
As shown, both the perplexity of LP-LDA and baseline
algorithm decrease with the increase of ε, which shows the
trade-off between the privacy and utility. For stronger pri-
vacy regime with smaller ε, the perplexity of LP-LDA is
larger than that of the baseline algorithm. That is because the
Laplace mechanism baseline algorithm incurs less noise than
randomized response in LP-LDA for the statistics of word
countNt. While for weaker privacy regime with larger ε, the
perplexity of LP-LDA is far less than that of the baseline al-
gorithm and shows greater LDA model training utility. These
utility comparison results can be also explained by the vari-
ance difference of the word countNt in two mechanisms. In
baseline mechanism based on Laplace noise, the noise vari-
ance is D(N ′t) = 2K
2/ε2, while the variance D(Nˆt) in our
proposed LP-LDA is shown in Equation (10). In particu-
lar, for larger ε on all three datasets, we can always have
D(Nˆt) < D(N
′
t).
5 Conclusion and future work
In this work, we investigate the privacy protection of LDA
model training. We first present that the CGS algorithm in
LDA can possess some inherent privacy in each sampling
process and then propose a efficient searching-based privacy
monitoring algorithm to identify the privacy guarantee bound
in the iterative CGS process of LDA. In addition, besides
training on a trustworthy data server, we also propose a lo-
cally private solution of LP-LDA to achieve LDA training
on a sanitized dataset by individual local users, which is ap-
plicable to many scenarios. The experiments on real-world
datasets validate our proposed approaches. Future work will
center on finding tighter bound of the inherent privacy guar-
antee in LDA model training.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The sensitivity obtained from topic j can be computed
as
ξj = | ln
p
′
j
pj
| = | ln(
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
·
∑
t(n
t
j + β)−Nj∑
t(n
t
j + β)
)|
then we compare ξj and ξk
ξk − ξj = | ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
+ ln
∑
t(n
t
k + β)−Nk∑
t(n
t
k + β)
|
− | ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
+ ln
∑
t(n
t
j + β)−Nj∑
t(n
t
j + β)
|
By condition (4), it’s easy to prove that
| ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
+ ln
∑
t(n
t
j + β) −Nk∑
t(n
t
j + β)
| < ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
(11)
We can observe that ξk = ξj when Nk = Nj = 0, and
ξk > ξj when Nk = 0, Nj 6= 0 and condition (11) holds.
Hence, ξk = max{ξ1 ξ2 ..., ξK} holds due to the arbitrariness
of k and j.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For convenience, we denote
ntk,¬i + β∑V
t=1(n
t
k,¬i + β)−Nk
·
nkm,¬i + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m,¬i + α)
by
ak
bk −Nk
where
ak = (n
t
k,¬i+β) ·
nkm,¬i + α∑K
k=1(n
k
m,¬i + α)
bk =
V∑
t=1
(ntk,¬i+β)
then the problem is transformed into proving that
∑
j 6=k
aj
bj
+
ak
bk −N
>
K∑
j=1
aj
bj −Nj
(12)
holds if
ak
bk −N
= max{
aj
bj −N
, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}}
inequality (12) is equivalent to
ak
bk −N
−
ak
bk
>
K∑
j=1
(
aj
bj −Nj
−
aj
bj
) (13)
To prove inequality (13), we consider a function set
Y = {yj(x), j ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}}
where
yj(x) =
aj
bj − x
−
aj
bj
then each function in Y is determined by a pair of parameters
(aj , bj). consider the relation between (aj , bj) and (ai, bi)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, it must belongs to one of two cases
below:
case1 : ai ≥ aj , bi ≤ bj case2 : ai < aj , bi > bj
Case1:It must holds that yi(Ni) + yj(Nj) < yi(Ni) +
yi(Nj) < yi(Ni + Nj) since yi(0) = yj(0) and y
′
i(x) >
y
′
j(x), ∀x > 0
Case2:It must holds that
yi(Ni) + yj(Nj) < max{yi(Ni +Nj), yj(Nj +Ni)}
In fact, it is easy to prove that there exists only one inter-
section in (0,min{bi, bj}) between yi(x) and yj(x),
denoted by (x∗, y∗). Based on this, the distribution of
Ni, Nj , Ni + Nj on number axis also has three cases to
consider:
case1: Nj ≤ x
∗, Ni +Nj > x
∗, by computing the deriva-
tives of y
′
i(x) and y
′
j(x), we have
yi(Ni) + yj(Nj) < max{yi(Ni +Nj), yj(Nj +Ni)}
case2: Nj > x
∗, Ni + Nj > x
∗, since yj(Nj) < yi(Nj)
holds, then:
yi(Ni) + yj(Nj) < max{yi(Ni +Nj), yj(Nj +Ni)}
case3:Ni +Nj ≤ x
∗, since yi(Ni) < yj(Ni) holds, then:
yi(Ni) + yj(Nj) < max{yi(Ni +Nj), yj(Nj +Ni)}
We have proved that there must exists function yi(x) such
that yi(N) >
∑K
j=1 yj(Nj) through the research above on
the property of yi(x) . So far, Lemma 1 has been proved.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Given a partition γ∗ = {N1, ...NK} not in P , it
suffices to verify that there exist some partitions from P such
that the privacy parameter obtained from γ∗ is smaller than
parameter from those partitions. Assume that the privacy
parameter from γ∗ is ε = 2ξ = 2max{ξ1 ξ2 ..., ξK} ,then
there are two cases need to be considered:
case1 : ξ < ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
case2 : ξ > ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
Case 1:Based on lemma 1, there exists a partition γ
′
from P
such that
∑
k r
′
k = maxγ{
∑
k r
′
k|γ} ,and since there exists
Nj = 0 in γ
′
, then according to corollary 1
εγ′ ≥ ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
|γ′ ≥ ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
|γ∗
Case 2:Based on theorem 1, elements in {ξ1 ξ2 ..., ξK} satisfy
ξj = | ln(
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
·
∑
t(n
t
j + β)−Nj∑
t(n
t
j + β)
)|
Since Nj ≪
∑
t n
t
j always holds, especially for a large cor-
pus, then it’s not hard to deduce that
ξj < ln
∑
k r
′
k∑
k rk
|γ′
until now, we have proved the existence of the γ
′
. According
to theorem 1, if condition (4) holds for each k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
with Nk = N , then equation (8) will hold directly. So far,
theorem 2 has been proved completely.
